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Abstract 
The paper lays the theoretical and methodological foundations of a new historically-minded 
approach to the comparative study of democratization, centered on the analysis of the 
creation, development and interaction of democratic institutions. Historically, democracy did 
not emerge as a singular coherent whole but rather as a set of different institutions, which 
resulted from conflicts across multiple lines of social and political cleavage that took place at 
different moments in time. The theoretical advantage of this approach is illustrated by 
highlighting the range of new variables that come into focus in explaining democracy’s 
emergence. Rather than class being the single variable that explains how and why democracy 
came about, we can see how religious conflict, ethnic cleavages, and the diffusion of ideas 
played a much greater role in Europe’s democratization than has typically been appreciated.  
Above all, we argue that political parties were decisive players in how and why democracy 
emerged in Europe and should be at the center of future analyses. 
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The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies: 
A New Research Agenda for Europe and Beyond
1 
 
1. Introduction 
After lying dormant for over a decade, the study of Europe’s historical transition to 
democracy (1848-1970s) has stirred.  As comparative social scientists understandably focused 
their attention on the short-term, often rapidly-changing, and dramatic post-1990 development 
of democracy throughout the world, the remarkable historical achievement of European 
democracy, was excluded from the immediate post-cold war debates about democracy’s 
causes and prospects.  There were arguably two main reasons for this “anti-historical” turn.  
On the one hand, Europe’s experience, increasingly in the distant past, was mistakenly 
presumed by many as fundamentally “unproblematic,” therefore sharing few commonalities 
with the often violent and painful nature of more immediate contemporary cases of 
democratization. On the other hand, the European historical experience was regarded as such 
well-trod empirical terrain that the prospect of new insights, new propositions, and new 
lessons seemed not particularly promising. 
Yet, as the post-Cold war enthusiasm for democracy seemed to ebb in the late 1990s 
(Carothers, 1999), a series of important controversies over historical cases of democratization 
                                                 
1 An earlier version of this paper won APSA’s 2010 Comparative Democratization Prize for 
best paper presented APSA 2009.  A revised version of this paper is forthcoming with 
Comparative Political Studies (August/September 2010). We thank for their comments Nancy 
Bermeo, Michael Bernhard, Jim Caporaso, Andy Gould, Gregorz Ekiert, Patrice Higonnet, 
Andy Martin, Wolfgang Merkel, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Richard Snyder, Hillel Soifer, 
Kathleen Thelen, as well as the participants to the workshop “The Challenges and Dilemmas 
of Democratization”, held at Harvard University, supported by the Center for European 
Studies, October 2-3, 2008. We also thank participants to workshops held at Harvard and 
Oxford University, as well as panels at the 2009 APSA and 2010 CES conventions. Our 
special thanks go to Peter Hall and Dan Slater for their extensive comments on earlier 
versions of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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emerged, leading scholars to ask: what are the appropriate lessons to be learned from Europe’s 
own difficult historical transition to democracy for new democracies today (e.g. Berman, 
2007)?  What theoretical implications about the contemporary effects of electoral rules can be 
drawn from analyzing the electoral reforms that accompanied the rise of universal suffrage 
(Boix 1999; 2010; Cusack et al. 2007, 2010; Rodden, 2009)?  Other scholars have also begun 
to revisit the turbulent history of democratization in Europe, asking foundational questions 
about key features of that momentous process: what prompted the initial move towards 
suffrage expansion beginning in nineteenth century Europe (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000; 
Llavador and Oxoby, 2005; Przeworski, 2008; Ziblatt, 2008; 2009a)?  What explains cross-
country differences in the process of democratization after those initial openings (Boix, 2003; 
Berins Collier 1999; Iversen and Soskice, 2009b; Tilly, 2004; 2007)?  And, finally what 
explains the diverse patterns of regime outcomes in Europe between the First and Second 
World Wars where democracy appeared so fragile (Bermeo, 2003; Bernhard, 2001, 2005; 
Berman, 2007; Capoccia, 2001; 2005; Ertman, 1998)?  In sum, because of the richness of the 
empirical material and importance of the topic, history sits again at center stage of 
comparative study of democratization, and the question of how democracy was stabilized in 
Europe has captured the imagination of a diverse group of scholars, appearing once again to 
offer possible insights for democratization more broadly. 
The collective “return to history” reflects a growing appreciation among political 
scientists of the conclusions that can be drawn from the history of democratization, and of the 
constraints imposed by history on the prospects of democratization. Furthermore, though 
history may not be a laboratory, it can help solve enduring problems of causality and 
endogeneity that plague standard ahistorical approaches (cf. Banerjee and Iyer 2008; Rodden, 
2009). As a diverse range of scholars therefore turn to historical case studies to bolster and   5 
refine their propositions, and as methodological debates have emerged (e.g. Diamond and 
Robinson, 2010; Kreuzer, 2010) over how best to do social scientific historical research, it is 
time to ask: how is historically-minded comparative analysis of democratization most 
effectively done?  The purpose of this essay and the volume as a whole is to answer this 
question. We reconceptualize the process of democratization in Europe and propose a 
methodological approach that allows uncovering important and often underappreciated 
political factors, thus suggesting future directions of research in the study of democratization 
in Europe and beyond.  
 
2. The Use of History in Democratization Studies: Methodological Foundations  
It is important to begin by noting that this revival of interest among contemporary 
political scientists owes a great debt to earlier generations of scholarship.  Crucially, however, 
this literature does not simply replay old debates.  To quote Robert Merton ([1957] 1968): just 
as it is a mistake to ignore the work of earlier generations to seek unearned originality, so too 
can excessive veneration of the classics degenerate into banality (1968, p. 30).  Thus, rather 
than dubbing older work “classics,” and placing them into an untouchable museum of 
antiquities, this work, as the articles in this symposium demonstrate, has productively begun 
to actively engage and argue with earlier scholarship, challenging and supplementing it in 
theoretical and empirical terms.  
Thus, our approach proposes a set of ideas that build on yet depart in important ways 
from the long “classical” tradition on the development of political regimes in Europe, seen 
most prominently in Barrington Moore’s masterpiece of historical analysis (Moore 1966), but 
also extending through to Luebbert’s (1991) and Rueschemeyer et al.’s (1992) work. These 
particular works shared three core methodological and theoretical dispositions. First, they   6 
sought to explain sweeping national trajectories of regime development, focusing less on 
short-term moments of regime transformation of the kind stressed in more recent “transitions” 
approaches such as O’Donnell and Schmitter’s (1986).  Second, they generally tended to 
downplay international factors and instead highlight the impact of domestic variables on 
democratization.  The third theoretical disposition of this work was an overwhelming 
emphasis on class variables as determinants of regime change.  While Moore’s innovative 
framework highlighted socio-economic conflict on the land (between peasants and landlords), 
Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992) focused on the strength of working class 
movements and parties, and Luebbert (1991) emphasized the ability of Liberal Parties to 
coopt working class parties as crucial.  In general, though self-consciously rejecting the 
assumptions of modernization theory (e.g. Lerner, 1958; Lipset 1959; Almond and Coleman, 
1960), all of these accounts shared a primary focus on the impact of class actors and class 
coalitions on regime change. 
Our approach to the study of European democratization builds on the core insights of 
these older works in several ways. It shares their commitment to historical sensitivity and their 
methodological orientation towards comparative historical analysis (Mahoney and 
Rueschemeyer 2003). At the same time, though, we propose to rethink the predominant 
temporalities of the analysis of European democratization used in past work. When social 
scientists “do” history, they tend to follow one of two models.  They use history as a source of 
data to test or to illustrate deductive theory (e.g. Bates et al. 1998).  Alternatively, social 
scientists use the core elements of history— such as timing, sequencing, critical junctures, 
path dependency, change, continuity— as building blocks of their theory (e.g. Pierson, 2004; 
Orren and Skowronek, 2004). It is this latter approach in particular that the work in this 
volume embraces. In brief, our approach elaborates the idea (found initially in Almond et al.   7 
1973) that history does not always move smoothly from period to period but instead moves 
via crises, or sharply punctuated episodes of change that have lasting consequences. To study 
the emergence of democratic institutions in light of this “historical turn” means that the 
analyst must “go back” to analyze systematically the historical episodes in which democratic 
institutions were created or substantially reshaped.
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While we are certainly interested in the long-run development of democracy, we 
contend that the long run itself was created in a chain of episodes of institutional changes that 
deserve closer scrutiny in their own right.  The focus on these episodes, their causes, and their 
consequences, results in an approach that is more attuned to capturing the causal complexity 
of institutional creation, and the impact of democratic institutions, once created, on future 
political outcomes.  This move allows us to highlight key empirical regularities that would 
otherwise be simply overlooked and to lay the foundations for generating empirically robust 
causal propositions. By contrast, alternative approaches miss these regularities because they 
focus exclusively on either the “grand sweep” of European democratic development and its 
highly stylized retrospectively-identified “trajectories”, or on dichotomously defined 
“moments” of democratic transition.  
The three pitfalls of studying democratization without history 
Building upon but making more explicit our understanding of “historical causality”, 
the approach proposed here allows analysts to self-consciously address three common 
methodological challenges or pitfalls that plague ahistorical accounts of democratization. The 
result of such ahistoricism is recurring empirical anomalies, a misconstruing of how events 
actually unfolded, and fundamental ambiguities in important causal claims. These theoretical 
and empirical problems are the consequence of three methodological pitfalls: ignoring causal   8 
heterogeneity; giving insufficient importance to microfoundations and the consequences of 
strategic interaction; and not accounting for the possible reciprocal causality between 
variables, thus inadequately appreciating path-dependent effects on the development of 
democratic institutions. These three pitfalls make clear why analyzing the unfolding of 
democratic institutions without a more careful and self-conscious strategy can be problematic.  
This section elaborates each of these themes.  
First, as empirically powerful as cross-national analyses are in identifying the 
structural correlates of democratization, such accounts usually rest on a model of causality 
that requires the assumption of unit homogeneity. This assumption (that a change in the value 
of variable x will produce a change in the outcome y of the same magnitude across all cases) 
is difficult to reconcile with closer empirical analysis of democratic institutional development.  
One example makes this point clear.  Empirical analysis has, at one level, quite convincingly 
demonstrated a robust correlation between the probability of democratic transition and 
declining socioeconomic inequality (i.e. an enlarged middle class) (Boix 2003). Others have 
seen working class mobilization as consistently the decisive factor driving democratization 
(e.g. Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992). However, at another level of analysis, 
careful in-depth case study work has found, for example in Berins Collier (1999), that the 
introduction of universal male suffrage in Europe was driven by at least three  factors in 
different combinations: first, middle-sector democratization; second, elite competition; and, 
third, joint liberal-labor projects (for a similar insight, see Iversen and Soskice, 2009b). 
Collier’s important insight is that although all of these collective actors may have been present 
in moments of democratization (Berins Collier 1999, p. 35), their impact was not uniformly 
important in the same direction across all cases.  Put differently, the causal logic of most 
cross-national empirical work is premised on the assumption that the impetus for   9 
democratization is always the same across all cases, and comes “from below” from specific 
segments of the population at large.  Recent and innovative case study and comparative work 
(e.g. Iversen and Soskice, 2009b; Llavador and Oxoby, 2005; Ziblatt, 2008) has demonstrated 
that elite competition “from above” is also often a driving force of democratization.  In short, 
with these multiple pathways, the causal logics underpinning the relationships leading to 
democratization may not be homogeneous.  
The same argument on causal heterogeneity can be made with reference to cross-time 
units: the fact that a certain set of variables that caused a democratic reform at time t2 was also 
present at time t1 did not necessarily mean that it had the same effect in both circumstances.  
In fact, even in the same country, democratization at t1 could have been caused by a different 
set of factors. In his work that informed Stein Rokkan’s analysis of the adoption of 
proportional representation in early twentieth century Europe, for example, Karl Braunias 
notes that the causes of the push for proportional representation in the 1880s and 1890s were 
very different (seeking “elite protections”) than in 1918 and beyond, when it was a more 
strictly anti-socialist measure (Braunias, 1932, pp. 201-204; see also Boix, 1999; Ahmed, 
2008). The conditions under which democratic institutions are reformed change, inducing 
actors to adapt their strategies. Moreover, actors do not start ex novo each time in their 
struggles over democratic institutions: just as pro-democratic activists may learn new and 
more effective strategies of mobilization from earlier instances of democratization, so too do 
autocratic incumbents, whether after 1848 or in 1989, look to the dynamics of regime change 
in other countries to learn new “repertoires of repression” (Beissinger 2002, p. 327).  In sum, 
often broad cross-national analyses assume, generally for reasons of parsimony, unit 
independence across time and space. However, different causal logics may be at work not   10 
only in different countries, but also in different phases of the process of democratization 
within the same country (Hall 2003). 
A second constraint on causal analysis that flows from inadequately conceptualizing 
the temporal element in the analysis of democratization is the tendency to provide accounts of 
democratization that lack in microfoundations and thus, in many cases, to underestimate the 
importance of the actual unfolding of the strategic interaction that led to the establishment or 
the reshaping of democratic institutions. Important recent analyses of democratization, while 
stretching back in time to historical cases and covering long periods, give greater priority to 
assessing causal effects than identifying causal mechanisms.  The result are often robust 
empirical findings that are, however, based on a series of intriguing but often untested 
assumptions about causal processes.  One common assumption, for example, is that the 
relevant actors are social classes (e.g. Cusack et al 2007) or even “income groups” (such as 
“the rich,” “the poor,” and “the middle class”: e.g. Boix 2003; Ansell and Samuels 2008, 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).  Political parties, often the crucial actors in the 
democratization process, are therefore assumed to be merely “representative” (i.e. mere stand-
ins) of these social aggregates. Other assumptions, often not explicitly articulated in these 
accounts but crucial to such arguments are, first, that these social actors have correct and full 
information on what their collective interests are; second, that they are sufficiently farsighted 
and instrumentally rational that they can and will act in the long-term interest of their 
constituency.
 2 While these views may at times be analytically useful, and may empirically 
hold in some instances, assuming they always do without any empirical verification suggests 
the need for the new kind of historical empirical work that we advocate here (Rodden 2009, p. 
349).
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Indeed, to assess the limits of existing findings, or to bolster the plausibility of existing 
arguments, we contend that it is crucial to pay attention to the microfoundations of the often 
contentious process by which democratic institutions are built (e.g. Skowronek and 
Glassmann 2007, p. 2).  Attention to microfoundations involves first and foremost empirically 
testing the assumptions mentioned above, which are generally observable from the historical 
record: do the constituencies of the political parties whose leaders take key decisions on the 
creation of democratic institutions overlap significantly with class or income group divisions? 
Is there any historical evidence that these actors understood the long-term interests of these 
constituencies and acted in pursuit of that rather than other objectives, such as the short-term 
electoral interests of the party, or of their clique within the party organization?  And, if the 
assumptions do not hold, are there alternative microfoundations that lead us to different 
conclusions?  Taking historical analysis seriously can take us a long way towards answering 
these and other important questions and towards building compelling theoretical arguments.  
Giving due attention to microfoundations almost invariably reveals the importance of 
the strategic interactions that lead to the creation or the reshaping of democratic institutions, at 
times with a significant degree of independence from underlying socio-economic conditions 
or class alignments.  Even holding such “structural” conditions constant, scholarship has 
demonstrated that politicians embrace suffrage reform (e.g. Przeworski, 2008; Ziblatt, 2008) 
or introduce other important changes in the rules governing national elections (e.g. Capoccia 
2010b) when it is in their electoral or strategic interest in the short-term. Moreover, several 
theoretical accounts have convincingly argued that institutional creation often takes place in 
conditions of high uncertainty, in which actors’ perceptions, and unforeseen, contingent 
events may have a large impact on institutional formation (e.g. Stinchcombe 1987, p. 102; see 
also Berlin 1974; Capoccia and Kelemen 2007; Mahoney 2001; Pierson 2000; Shapiro and   12 
Bedi 2006, Mayhew 2006).  This suggests the potential causal importance of political 
mistakes, misperceptions, and unintended consequences (e.g. Turner 1999), on both strategic 
behavior and institutional outcomes. Without sensitivity to these dynamics, we may miss the 
actual process by which democracy emerges.  
Finally, a third pitfall of studying democratization without history is the problem of 
circular causality, seen in the reoccurring debate about the direction of causality between 
correlates of democratization and democratization itself.  One source of the difficulty is that 
ahistorical accounts are generally ill-suited to do full justice to the often-lasting impact of 
institutional arrangements on political and economic outcomes.  For example, one of the most 
important debates in current studies of democratization centers on the issue of whether 
democratization is exogenous or endogenous to the correlates of socioeconomic development.  
Early cross-national findings presumed an endogenous relationship: increased wealth was 
thought to lead to more stable democratization (Lipset, 1959).  Przeworski and Limongi 
(1997), however, have challenged this point, arguing that democracies are created “for many 
reasons” and that the correlation between wealth and democracy reflects the greater stability 
of wealthy countries, once they have already democratized.   
But most recently, Boix and Stokes have provided additional evidence of democracy’s 
endogeneity to development.  The authors quite convincingly contend that universal suffrage 
and expanded voting rights (a subset of democracy’s core institutions) do not explain 
economic growth and industrialization (Boix and Stokes, 2003, p. 539). However, they also 
note that another subset of the institutions of modern democracy created at an earlier point in 
time (i.e. liberal constitutional structures) likely contributed to the very socio-economic 
growth that subsequently gave rise to further changes in democratic institutions in Europe 
(Ibid.).  Thus, embedded in this endogenous account of democratization is the notion that   13 
democracy is more than the short-run product of its socioeconomic correlates but instead is 
itself the outer tip of a much longer historical chain. Therefore, to explain fully the 
relationship of economic development and democratization requires unbundling our concept 
of democracy itself and being attuned to the possibly asynchronic sequence (Ziblatt, 2006) by 
which its different institutional components emerge, their causes, and their consequences.  
In sum, theoretical ambiguities will likely persist unless we make use of substantive 
historical knowledge (both original research and “off the shelf” knowledge) of how 
democratic institutions actually emerged.  This helps us untangle the directionality of our 
most important empirical findings. Moreover, coming to analytical grips with the problem of 
circularity means that scholars tend to rely, at least implicitly, on notions of path-dependence 
and “feedback effects” of institutions (Skocpol 1992; Pierson 1993).  If democratic 
institutional arrangements created at an earlier stage may constitute important resources for 
political actors in later struggles that lead to institutional change in other, connected, arenas 
(e.g. a fight for expansion of suffrage may have different outcomes depending on the state of 
other existing democratic institutions), then, both history and path dependence are crucial.  
Yet, there has been a tendency to refer to history somewhat selectively, not incorporating 
either history or path dependence explicitly and systematically in such debates, although it is 
clear that accounts of democratization without either are fundamentally incomplete. 
How to study democratization in time 
 
Given the difficulties of trying to reconstruct causality without history, we should be 
clear about our purposes.  Though we are highlighting the ambiguities and complexities of 
democratization, the correct response to complexity is certainly not to abandon the pursuit of 
empirical generalization. Instead, we propose an empirical strategy that offers a tractable way   14 
of addressing these issues systematically, while providing the building blocks of a richer but 
still parsimonious theoretical account. Our approach to the study of democratization can be 
summarized in five interrelated propositions.  
1.  First, we propose the adoption of an explicitly historical approach to causality. 
Following both classical analyses and recent insights in the institutionalist literature (e.g. 
Bloch 1954 [1949]; Pierson 2004), we stress that history should be read “forward” and not 
“backwards”.  Rather than looking at outcomes at a single moment in time and their 
relationship with their contemporaneous correlates to “explain” democratization, or 
retrospectively explain contemporary variations, we go back to investigate the foundational 
moments when democratic institutions were actually created, and undertake a thorough 
analysis of the ideologies, resources, and institutional legacies shaping the choices of actors 
involved in the process of institution-building. This approach uses contemporary social 
science techniques to test theories rigorously but with an eye to the knotty set of factors 
associated with the creation of institutions and their successive endurance. Thus, armed with a 
historical approach to causality, we can develop explanations of democracy that do not rely on 
the common and misleading assumption that the contemporary functions of particular political 
institutions can always explain their historical emergence (Pierson, 2004). 
2.  Second, the articles in this volume make clear the value, especially in the European 
historical context, of conceptualizing democratization not as a process that was achieved in 
single moments of wholesale regime transition, but rather as a protracted and punctuated “one 
institution-at-a-time” process, in which the institutional building blocks of democracy 
emerged asynchronically (Ziblatt 2006).  In this view, democracy is metaphorically best seen 
as a “collage” rather than a canvas (Bermeo 2010).  It is true that democratic regimes are in 
principle normatively coherent, consisting primarily of institutions that distribute power and   15 
protect rights in a manner that make rulers accountable to the electorate, and provide channels 
of participation for the adult population (e.g. Dahl 1989).  However, it is crucial to emphasize 
that the complex institutional configuration of democracies rarely emerges all at once. On the 
contrary, different institutions often emerge at different times, often for different reasons.  
Thus, it is important to narrow our analytic look from the whole regime to a more detailed 
analysis of the emergence of the discrete democratic institutions that together define the 
content of political regimes.
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3.  Since democracy as whole protractedly emerges one institution-at-a-time, a powerful 
research strategy in the study of democratization is to reconstruct the political fault lines 
structuring democratization by the analysis of key episodes of institutional change.  This 
strategy allows an accurate reconstruction of what actors were actually fighting about, turning 
the researcher’s attention to new variables that were previously overlooked, and bringing the 
politics of institutional change more directly and explicitly into the study of democratic 
development (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Ziblatt, 2009b).  As explained in more detail 
below, depending on the range of choices available to actors and the potential impact of their 
decisions, episodes of reform potentially constitute important critical junctures in the 
development of each specific institution, in which events or political decisions may have long-
lasting path-dependent effects (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007; Capoccia 2010b; see also 
Mayhew 2006; Skowronek and Glassmann 2007). The analysis of episodes shows, among 
other things, that conflicts over democratic institutions do not occur “sealed-off” from each 
other, merely reflecting domestic conditions at the time. Instead, past experiences of 
successful or failed democratization (from other countries as well as within the same country) 
structure the action of democracy’s opponents and proponents by arming actors with 
competing causal narratives or “lessons” from the past, thus significantly shaping their   16 
behavior. 
4.  Fourth, by adopting this distinctive approach, we can move beyond a singular 
emphasis on class or socio-economic variables as the drivers of democratization to instead 
highlight that multiple lines of conflict motivate and shape actors participating in the crucial 
bargains or struggles that give rise to democratic institutions. Democratic institutions have 
important consequences, even though sometimes unintended, on future political interactions, 
empowering some groups over others (e.g. Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Przeworski 1993). It is 
the important effects of political institutions which in no small part explain the high level of 
conflict associated with moments of democratization.
5 As the articles in this volume 
demonstrate, when one “goes back and looks” at the conflicts that shape the creation of 
democratic institutions, religious, ethnic and ideological divisions generally play an important 
role alongside socio-economic factors—and often they are the crucial determinants. If these 
factors have not “been there” in previous studies of European democratization, it is because 
we have not looked closely enough. In this respect, it is necessary to start re-thinking the 
autonomous role played by political parties, as key strategic actors —often decisive in the 
European context— in shaping democracy’s emergence in crucial episodes.  Though theories 
of parties and party systems are a key component of contemporary political science, our 
theories of how and why parties behave when it comes to democratization are often simply 
theories of social class and interest redeployed to explain party behavior. Parties existed in 
Europe even before democracy. Thus, a focus on within- and between-party power dynamics, 
as well as the relationship of parties to interest groups in important moments of institutional 
change is crucial to explain patterns of European democratization.   
5.   Finally, recasting the study of democratization in terms of episodes in which 
democratic institutions historically emerged and were reformed, helps us rethink how   17 
democracies are created and develop over the long-run. Democratization is not only the 
passing of singular momentous thresholds of democratic transition as the “transitions” 
literature sometimes presumes, but instead is itself a long-term process that can usefully be 
thought of as a chain of big and small events, not always moving unidirectionally towards full 
democracy.  In Europe, democratic institutions developed over the long-run at discrete but 
decisive moments over many decades, the most momentous of which were the “turning 
points” of 1848, 1918, 1945, and 1989.  Though these were “transformational” events, which 
changed “the very cultural categories that shape and constrain human action” (Sewell 1996, p. 
263; Macdonald 1996), a contention running through this volume is that political scientists’ 
conventional periodization schemes that exclusively relies on such well-known “switch 
points” is potentially deeply misleading. Indeed, if the analytical focus is shifted from the 
development of democracy as a whole to single democratic institutions (e.g. the extension of 
suffrage, the approval of a new constitution, the reform of the national electoral system, rules 
preventing electoral fraud) “smaller” episodes of democratization then sit at the center of 
analysis as potentially important critical junctures for those institutions, leaving open the 
possibility that democratic reforms may stall or come under retrenchment. These junctures 
become crucial sites of causality for democracy as a whole: friction or complementarity 
between different institutional arenas, or the different timing in their development (Orren and 
Skowronek 2004), may have important consequences for democracy as such, generating 
different types of democracy and different levels of regime stability.  
Multiple registers of causation, critical junctures, and episode analysis 
 
An analytical focus on episodes of institutional reform. connects the creation or the 
restructuring of democratic institutions to their actual causal determinants in each case (e.g.   18 
Elster 2006), thus combining the advantages of historical sensitivity to micro-foundations 
with attention to the potential impact of impersonal causes. The purpose of episode analysis is 
therefore not just identifying correlates but attempting to reconstruct systematically which 
variables have causal force in leading to institutional reform in the moments in which 
institutions come into existence or are substantially reformed (e.g. Cartwright 1989). As 
explained below, one point of contact of this approach with recent epistemological work in 
historical sociology is the reference to multiple registers of causality, including structural as 
well as conjunctural determinants, which can be decisive in different circumstances (e.g. 
Sewell 1996, pp. 268-269; see also Turner 1996, 1999). 
In some cases, conjunctural determinants prove decisive. Following Capoccia and 
Kelemen’s (2007) recent theoretical innovation, in cases where the range of choices available 
to decision-makers expands significantly and so does the impact of their decisions, an episode 
constitutes an important critical juncture in the development of a specific institution. In these 
cases, an institutional outcome is overwhelmingly the result of events or decisions taken 
during a short phase of uncertainty, in which the relaxation of structural influences on political 
agency opens up opportunities for a small number of powerful actors to generate lasting 
institutional change (e.g. Mahoney 2001; Skowronek and Glassmann 2007). In other cases, 
however, the outcome of institutional reform overwhelmingly reflects the impact of structural 
antecedents on the strategic interaction leading to institutional change (e.g. Collier and Berins 
Collier 1991).
6 In this respect, this research engages directly with classical democratization 
theories, assessing how structural factors often seen as driving long-term trajectories of 
democratic development actually influence the politics of democratic reform in key episodes.
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“Reading history forward” —i.e. adopting an ex ante, rather than hindsight, 
approach— is crucial in order to reconstruct what actors were actually fighting about and   19 
assess the respective causal force of structural and conjunctural factors in creating democratic 
institutions. Episode analysis identifies the key political actors fighting over institutional 
change, highlight the terms of the debate and the full range of options that they perceived, 
reconstruct the extent of political and social support behind these options, and analyze, as 
much as possible with the eyes of the contemporaries, the political interactions that led to the 
institutional outcome (e.g. Bloch 1954 [1949], p. 125; Trevor-Roper 1980). In this sense, the 
assessment of how much an observable institutional outcome can be explained by more 
contingent political decisions rather than by earlier antecedents or later developments is above 
all a matter of empirical investigation and of comparing the “critical-ness” of different 
episodes in the chain leading to that outcome (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, pp. 360-363).  
This analytical strategy not only provides the tools to generate more accurate accounts 
of institutional change, but it also has the advantage of uncovering analytically interesting 
“near-misses”, which would otherwise disappear from history, thus seriously biasing our 
understanding of democratization processes.  It is often the case that key decisions in 
democratic institutional reforms were the object of debate among elites and larger sectors of 
the public, in which alternatives were articulated and considered, and at times narrowly 
defeated, to the surprise of most contemporaries (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, p. 352; Ziblatt, 
2008).  In these instances, episodes of “quasi-reform” where outcomes might plausibly have 
gone another way are analytically as interesting as episodes of successful reform (e.g. 
Weingast 1996). Examples might include a suffrage reform that nearly achieves a 
parliamentary majority but falls to defeat by only a very narrow margin (Ziblatt, 2008); or an 
uprising of powerful anti-democratic forces barely avoided by the close result of a presidential 
election (Capoccia, 2005, pp. 163-165). Whether the “near-miss” outcome is the result of 
predominantly structural and impersonal conditions, or the product of essentially exogenous   20 
decisions and events, it is important to underscore that such “negative-case” episodes are fully 
amenable to empirical study: plausible, near-miss counterfactuals can be supported by 
historical evidence as much as “factuals” (e.g. Lebow 2000b). Reconstructing the motivations 
and structural forces shaping pivotal decision-makers in a narrowly failed reform can be 
empirically investigated as much as the study of events that actually happened (Fearon 1991; 
Tetlock and Belkin 1996; Turner 1999; Lebow 2000a; Levy 2008).  In short, historically 
informed and theoretically-driven counterfactual reflection on the possible consequences of 
the non-selected options of institutional reform is essential to “bring back to history” the full 
range of difficulties and contradictions that characterize democratization, thus avoiding the 
implicit selection bias that would result from an exclusive focus on “positive” cases of 
democratic reform (e.g. King et al. 1994).  
In light of the above, what is the model for writing up an episode?  The work in this 
volume deploys a variety of empirical strategies but one particular approach is worth 
highlighting because it is innovative for comparative historical work: leveraging “within-
case” data for the analysis of important potential moments of democratization.  This approach 
allows one to test systematically macro theories (i.e. one “rounds up the usual suspects” of 
possible independent variables) with micro-level quantitative data, using those to estimate the 
actual impact of socio-economic factors on decision-makers. It also allows the analyst, with a 
close knowledge of the cases, to formulate and then test new possible hypotheses.  For 
example, reconstructing moments of decision, we can ask: What is the relative electoral 
leverage of important groups, including Churches and large landowners, on MPs deciding on 
key democratic reforms (Capoccia 2010a)?  Did land inequality play a role in decision-
making of political leaders in a decisive moment of possible democratic transition (Ziblatt 
2008)? Was the ethnically diverse constituency of a political party decisive in constraining (or   21 
empowering) the party leadership in supporting (or opposing) the creation of a certain 
institutional arrangement (Kopstein and Wittenberg 2010)? Taking systematically into 
account how these antecedent factors influence strategic interaction, the study of episodes 
extends the view to long-term factors and corrects the “research design bias” that would 
follow from the exclusive focus on short-term and voluntaristic factors typical of many case 
studies (Pierson 2003). 
Last but not least, studying democratization through the analytical focus outlined 
above leaves space for analysts to see path dependent phenomena in the development of 
democracy.  Key episodes of reform and important critical junctures have lasting 
consequences in at least two senses: first, because they have the potential to entrench power 
relations that may outlast their social foundations, setting the parameters for future strategic 
interactions and thus influencing the possibility and the direction of further institutional 
changes (North 1990; Pierson 2000; Shepsle 2008; Mahoney and Thelen, 2009); second, 
participants in important episodes (e.g. the Fall of the Berlin Wall, the Easter Uprising) can 
sometimes turn them into “iconic” or “transformative events” that provide a narrative for 
reformers in subsequent episodes of reform (Sewell, 1996, 2005; Beissinger, 2002, 2006). The 
broader point is that the research presented in this volume recasts European democratization 
as the successive and linked establishment of institutional arrangements across a cluster of 
institutional realms that make rulers accountable and enlarge and regulate popular 
participation. “Episodes of institutional change” matter because they often generate self-
sustaining institutions and narratives, which influence political outcomes. Therefore, episodes 
are not to be seen in isolation: the institutions put in place in an earlier episode often become 
important antecedents of a later one.    22 
In sum, an approach based on these methodological foundations helps us recast in a 
significant way the analysis of how democratization in Europe occurred.  Current 
conceptualizations operate either with starkly bifurcated research designs that presume that 
countries pass from non-democracy to democracy at singular “transition” moments or 
thresholds or, alternatively, that countries develop on what sometimes appear to be “pre-set” 
trajectories of development to “fascism” or “democracy,” whose smaller institutional steps of 
reforms and setbacks do not matter to a country’s broader path of development.  Naturally 
scholars recognize conceptually that democracy in Europe developed in leaps and bounds, and 
that democratic institutions were created at different times.  But despite this conceptual 
awareness, our empirical work has not come to grips with this point. That is precisely what 
the methodology proposed here does: if democracy is built one institution at a time, our 
research designs must make room for this.  
3. Theoretical Insights: Cleavages, Ideas, and Political Parties in European 
democratization 
The approach outlined above offers methodological guidance to analyses of 
democratization inspired by the “historical turn”, and it provides us an alternative way of 
thinking about how democracy emerged.  But does it generate useful and original insights into 
why stable democracies emerged in Europe in the way they did?  By abandoning the 
epistemological assumptions of ex post analyses that implicitly read history “backwards” and 
only look at democracy’s “finish line” and its retrospectively-identified correlates, several 
theoretical insights emerge. When we see democratization not as an automatic outgrowth of 
economic development or the predominance of a single class or a class coalition, but rather as 
emerging in nonlinear and punctuated fashion, in moments of choice and change that occur   23 
asynchronically in different institutional arenas, and whose outcomes are often only indirectly 
shaped by socioeconomic conflict, a set of underexplored causal dynamics and empirical 
regularities begin to appear, generating hypotheses for further study.  
Three major themes that have been increasingly highlighted by scholars working on 
European political development and related fields, but that have not yet been systematically 
integrated into the study of democratization, are brought to the foreground: first, the 
importance of non-class factors, including religion, church-state relations, and ethnicity in 
driving institutional change; second, the role of ideas and ideational transfer in molding 
democratic institutions; third, and most important, the autonomous role played by political 
parties in the emergence of democracy in Europe.  Political parties existed in Europe in 
different forms before democracy emerged, and accompanied its development all along, 
bringing non-class divisions and ideational factors to bear directly on the fight over 
democratic institutions.  By focusing on parties as actors in their own right, rather than 
considering them as “empty vessels” (Katz and Kolodny 1994), i.e. passive agents of socio-
economic interests, we see more clearly that it is not only class conflict that shaped European 
democratization.  It was the intersection of multiple cleavages, mediated, expressed, and at 
times activated by political parties that shaped where, when, and why democracies emerged 
where they did in Europe’s history. We review these themes below and outline the contours of 
a research agenda that can usefully guide future research on European democratization. 
Beyond the Class Cleavage: The Role of Religion and Ethnicity 
  
Since at least Barrington Moore (1966), socio-economic factors have played a central 
role in theories of democratization. To be sure, important “material” constraints and 
opportunities do shape the strategies of decision-makers and organized interests (e.g.   24 
Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992; Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). 
When focusing on episodes rather than sweeping trajectories, it becomes important to 
reconstruct as accurately as possible the ways in which key political actors interpreted their 
world (the existing constraints and opportunities) and how such interpretation impacted their 
decision-making. Hence, in addition to socio-economic divisions (sectoral conflict, class 
conflict), our attention turns to the kinds of factors that Stein Rokkan (1970) long ago 
identified as crucial for European political development: religious and ethnic cleavages.  
Indeed, the literature on democratization in other parts of the world has also highlighted how 
non-class variables are often the driving force of democratization (e.g. Slater 2009). 
Part of what has made Rokkan’s theoretical insights difficult for democratization 
theorists to assimilate fully is the elaborate macro-conceptual framework that guided his 
mapping of European political development. The approach proposed in this volume, by 
contrast, provides a new and methodologically more tractable way of incorporating these 
important insights into our theories of democratization.  A focus on episodes of institutional 
reconfiguring highlights how ethnicity and religion may get activated along with socio-
economic and class divisions in moments of political conflict over democratic institutions.  
Important recent works on European political development have highlighted the 
importance of such non-material factors for shaping both the durability and the structure of 
democratic regimes.  For example, Andrew Gould (1999) has shown that the electoral strength 
of Liberal parties, themselves decisive actors in the stabilization of nineteenth century 
European democracies, hinged not on levels of economic modernization but instead on the 
nature of religious cleavages and church-state relations.  Similarly, Stathis Kalvyas (1996) has 
demonstrated that “a marriage of convenience” between some conservative parties and 
Church institutions was a crucial part of the secularization and transformation of many   25 
European polities. Also, Jason Wittenberg (2006) has shown how partisan loyalties, a key 
building-block of democracy, survived from the interwar period to the post-communist period 
in East Central Europe chiefly on the shoulders of religious networks and institutions. Finally, 
recent work has similarly emphasized the importance of ethnic conflict on contemporary 
European politics (e.g. Birnir, 2007). In sum, the persistence and salience of these non-
economic cleavages point to the fact that the politics of European democratization was in 
most cases multidimensional. This characteristic is unlikely to be captured adequately by the 
mono-dimensional redistributive models underlying strictly class-based theories of 
democratization.  
Ideas and ideational transfer: Diffusion and political learning 
 
In a similar fashion, viewing the history of European democratization through the lens 
of historical episodes allows us to assess the impact that political ideas (beliefs, symbols) may 
have, in interaction with the existing institutional and structural conditions (e.g. Hall 1989, p. 
390) on both the process and the outcome of institutional reform. Approaches focusing on the 
power of material interests to explain the emergence of democratic institutions generally 
assume that individual or collective actors, if similarly placed vis-à-vis the market, have 
similar preferences on which institutional arrangements best foster their “objectively” defined 
material interests.
8 However, the importance of ideational factors for institution-building has 
been emphasized in recent developments in related bodies of literature. First of all, several 
works have argued that the more uncertain the objective conditions surrounding institutional 
creation are, the more likely political actors are to rely on ideational filters to interpret reality 
and orient their strategies, thus giving ideas an independent causal role (e.g. Elster et al. 1998; 
Hall 2006; Darden 2009). In other words, if the future is highly unpredictable, the range of   26 
plausibly rational strategies expands accordingly, and actors that are similarly positioned 
socio-economically may interpret their world in very different ways, and accordingly pursue 
different projects of institutional change (e.g. Jervis 1976; Parsons 2007, 130).  
Indeed, in struggles over the reform of democratic institutions, ideas generally play an 
important role through dynamics of spatial and temporal diffusion, which are often crucial in 
shaping what is perceived as desirable and feasible (Bermeo 1992; Kopstein and Reilly, 2000; 
Elkins and Simmons, 2005; Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett, 2006; Coppedge and Brinks 2006; 
Weyland 2007).  With few exceptions, however, earlier accounts of European democratization 
have treated cases and episodes of democratization as if they were largely sealed off from 
each other. The articles in this volume emphasize instead that episodes of democratization are 
often linked through processes of spatial and temporal diffusion (learning).  
This can happen in several ways. First, the institutional outcomes of important 
moments of democratization can be in large part explained by the process by which decision-
makers adopted earlier models from other national contexts. Just as economic historians often 
must remind us that globalization before 1914 more closely approximated our own period 
than we often imagine (e.g. Rodgers, 1998; Berger, 2003; Frieden, 2006), so too is it useful to 
remember that democratization experiences may also be driven by global trends, today as well 
as in this earlier era.  This dynamic is particularly apparent in constitution-making in 
European states starting already in the 19
th century.  A second mechanism focuses less on the 
diffusion of formal institutional models and instead highlights the impact of what we can call 
“iconic events” (e.g. the Easter Uprising, the Prague Spring, the Fall of the Berlin Wall) that 
become, in Edelman’s terms, “condensation symbols” (Edelman, 1964). Such events may 
generate a larger interpretative framework that shapes subsequent democratization episodes by 
providing both democratic reformers and authoritarian incumbents with powerful “lessons”   27 
from the past. Moreover, iconic events may sometimes generate new externally-provoked 
critical junctures, expanding the realm of political action and opening possibilities for 
institutional change (e.g. Beissinger 2002, p. 15). For example, the momentous events of 1830 
and 1848 in France, and 1917-1919 in Russia unleashed a wave of diffusion on the European 
continent.  These events —but also the post-episode narrative of these events— had the effect 
of suggesting to both elites and the public in other countries that revolutionary change had 
become desirable and feasible. The same dynamics is observable within a single country, for 
example in the succession of suffrage reforms in Great Britain after 1832 (McLean, 2001, pp. 
61-77). In those and other cases, the impact of past historical episodes opened up causal space 
for ideational factors and repertoires of mobilization that were often decisive in facilitating 
subsequent anti-regime mobilization (Beissinger, 2007).
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The Importance of Political Parties in Democratization 
 
The articles in this collection analyze the building of different democratic institutions, 
at different times from the 1830s to the 1970s, and in different European countries. Yet, in 
virtually all of them, political parties emerge as crucial actors on the democratization stage.  
Of course, decision-makers generally are individual politicians in powerful positions, 
but the scholarship in this volume shows how their decisions are often constrained and 
enabled to an important extent by the logic of within- and between-party competition and 
coalition, rather than exclusively by the influence of social classes or income groups. And yet, 
our theories of democratization to date remain largely theories that explain the preferences 
and strategies of social classes and interests, with the assumption that this too explains the 
actions of political actors.  As all articles in this collection make clear, though, treating   28 
political parties as mere passive “agents” of social interests is likely to paint a misleading 
picture of the process of democratization in Europe.  
Generally speaking, two important points have been lost in recent theories of 
democratization: first, that although class parties are present in all European countries 
(Bartolini and Mair 1990), the social constituencies of European political parties do not 
always neatly overlap with economically-defined social groups (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; 
Rokkan 1970, Rokkan et al. 1999; Rokkan and Urwin 1983; see also Lawson et al 1999; 
Kommisrud 2009).
10 In several European party systems, for example, both the “left” and the 
“right” are represented by multiple parties, a circumstance that has historically opened up 
manifold possibilities for strategic coalitions over specific institutional reforms that do not just 
replicate class divisions. Second, European political parties have historically proved quite 
flexible and proactive in reshaping their social constituencies to adapt to social change 
(Kitschelt 1994; Mair 1997). As a consequence, party ideologies, conflicts and alliances 
within and between parties, and the relationship of parties with interest groups are likely to 
generate independent incentives for institutional reform that are at least as important as those 
deriving directly from socio-economic divisions in the electorate. The insight that these 
factors can have momentous consequences for political outcomes has traditionally been at the 
core of a large literature on parties and party systems (e.g. Duverger 1951; Sartori 1976; Katz 
and Mair 1994), but has never been systematically brought to bear on analyses of 
democratization, which is what we propose to do here.
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Before articulating these themes and their importance for democratization, though, two 
caveats are in order. First, we do not impute agency to party organizations per se. On the 
contrary, we maintain that an episode-based approach is a powerful device to untangle how 
party elites navigate organizational and structural conditions (e.g. Kitschelt 1994). Second,   29 
given the indispensability of “theory-generation” for what Theda Skocpol and Margaret 
Somers (1980) usefully call larger “research cycles,” it is important to underscore that the 
overall purpose of this essay and volume is to generate theory and outline an agenda for 
future research (see also Collier, 1991).  Making room in our analyses of democratization for 
party-related factors generates more specific hypotheses linking party interaction and ideology 
to democratization. The hypotheses advanced in this volume require systematic testing in 
future research; however, it should be emphasized that they came into view in no small part 
because of the approach to the study of democratization advocated here. 
To begin with, party ideology can have an independent impact on the formation of 
political coalitions in favor or against a certain institutional reform, and at times may be 
decisive in determining whether democratic institutions will endure at all. When parties 
represent a constituency made of a coalition of social groups, ideology is crucial in 
aggregating their potentially contrasting “material” interests; even in the case of class parties, 
their ideological set-up can define class interests differently. In both cases, ideology may have 
momentous consequences for institution-building. For example, European Socialist and 
Communist parties, though representing putatively similar interests (i.e. labor), were often 
divided in the twentieth century on the very desirability of democratic institutions (e.g. 
Berman 2006).  Even within the same party family, different ideological profiles could also 
play a fundamental and autonomous role for policy choices that in turn may have crucial 
consequences for democratic institutions, as Berman (1998) illustrates in her comparison of 
the German and Swedish Social Democrats’ responses to the Great Depression (Berman 
1998).  
Similarly, power dynamics within parties themselves, or within the party system, can 
also at times be the main determinant of political alignments, independent of socio-economic   30 
structure, that are important in struggles for institutional change.  In general terms, the 
political decision-makers that are protagonists of episodes of institutional change have 
multiple interests and identities, and so do their actual and potential electors (e.g. Hall 1996; 
2006). Thus, decision-makers do not only act as direct representatives of their electoral 
constituency, operating on behalf of economically- or culturally-defined segments of society, 
but also as self-interested power-holders or power-seekers within the party organization itself, 
facing a separate set of inducements and constraints.  These “within-organization” 
inducements and constraints can derive from both the struggle for power within the party and 
the logic of political alliances and oppositions within the broader party system.   
To be sure, intra-party conflicts over an institutional reform may at times be due to 
divisions within a party’s constituency along socio-economic, religious, ethnic, or ideological 
lines.  However, in other cases the promotion of new institutional reforms may increase a 
faction’s power within the party itself (e.g. Panebianco 1988; see also Weir 2006).  In such 
circumstances, rather than intra-party splits reflecting social divisions, it is faction leaders 
who mobilize different identities within the party’s electorate to pursue their power strategy, 
and legitimize it by appealing to electors (e.g. Chandra 2004). Furthermore, in most cases 
when parties or intra-party factions negotiate and clash over the reform of democratic 
institutions, they also negotiate and clash about their power relations with one another in the 
context of the broader party system. They will be considering which possible allies could help 
them achieve their goals, whether they have realistic prospects of leaving the existing 
alliances, and whether other alliances are available.  The outcome of such considerations is 
often determined by the short-term electoral and power prospects of these actors, more than 
their willingness to cater to the long-term interests of socio-economic constituencies. For 
example, the rise of the Sudeten German Nazis (SdP) after 1933 gave the right-wing of the   31 
Czechoslovak Agrarian party, a party that was a pivotal coalition partner within the 
government, the opportunity to reassert the influence they had lost over the previous decade. 
Their plan to include the SdP in the national government had the purpose of shifting the 
balance of power in their favor within both the party and the government coalition. The 
resistance to this project opposed by the internal left wing of the Agrarians and their political 
allies led to the introduction of important institutional reforms that increased emergency 
powers and sanctioned political extremism to an extent never seen before in European 
democracies (Capoccia 2002; 2005, pp. 83-90).  In brief, political dynamics related to the 
pursuit of power within the party organization and the party system often shape clashes over 
the reform of democratic institutions.  
Finally, parties’ relationship with interest groups may also have an autonomous 
influence on democratic reforms. A well-developed literature makes clear that parties stances’ 
on all issues may at times appear as “two-level-games,” reflecting not only party leaders’ 
relationship with the electorate as a whole but also simultaneously with their supporting 
interest groups, complicating what might appear a predictable position on key issues (e.g. 
Karol, 2009). Parties may dominate their interest groups, giving them greater autonomy; they 
may be captured by them on a broad or narrow range of issues; or, parties may be on the 
search for new interest group partners, giving greater flux to partisan positions entirely.  These 
dynamics by no means can be predicted directly from socio-economic structures alone. For 
example, the opposition of the German Conservative Party before 1914 to suffrage reform in 
Prussia (a move that would have fostered democratization in Germany more generally) can be 
explained by the party’s weak internal structure, leaving it dependent on, and thus “captured” 
by a well-organized interest group —the radical Agrarian League— whose influence on the 
party’s policy stances was completely out of proportion with its actual position in the   32 
economy.  Furthermore, party competition within Prussia left the same party fearing that it 
would lose out electorally in a situation of full suffrage, beyond the distributional threats 
triggered by democratization (Ziblatt, 2008, 2010).
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In sum, future research on European democratization would benefit from moving 
away from a nearly exclusive focus on how socio-economic conflict broadly construed 
translates into politics to also consider the way in which the often interrelated conflicts over 
party ideology, the pursuit of power within party organizations, the dynamics of competition 
within party systems, and the interface of parties and their supporting interest groups shape 
the struggle over democratic institutions. 
 
4. Empirical Illustrations 
The articles in this collection range across a broad spatial and temporal scope, 
illuminating the themes outlined above.  Demonstrating the analytical reach of the approach 
we have developed, the empirical contributions in this volume, taken together, tell the story of 
Europe’s long democratization.  By focusing on how a variety of often underappreciated 
factors, ranging from the structure of ethnic and religious cleavages to partisan strategies, 
have shaped some of the major episodes of Europe’s democratic development, the papers tell 
the collective story of how and why Europe’s democratization has proceeded in the way it 
has, suggesting that these and similar episodes have had cumulative effect, over two-hundred 
years of fundamentally transforming, and indeed, arguably making modern Europe.  
Taking stock of the prior discussion, the overarching theme of the papers is that the 
creation and reform of democratic institutions often owes more than it is normally assumed to 
political interactions rather than to the direct and automatic translation of socio-economic   33 
dynamics into politics.  As soon as they emerged on the scene in European polities, political 
parties became the main protagonists of this interaction, shaping outcomes in important ways.  
But it is important to remember that political variables mattered for the construction of 
democratic institutions even before the onset of what we might call the long “era of parties” 
that has characterized European politics over the past two centuries.  
This is first seen in Zachary Elkins’ account of European early nineteenth century 
constitution-making.  Elkins’ account boldly turns diffuse skepticism over the epiphenomenal 
nature of “parchment” institutions on its head, as he maintains that the approval of a formal 
constitution, even if quickly reversed, has a positive impact for a country’s democratization. 
After tracing what he calls the complex genealogy of European constitutional documents in 
the 19
th century, Elkins maintains that in many cases the institutions designed in Europe’s pre-
democratic constitutional assemblies bore little resemblance with to domestic factors such as 
the power of different social classes or income groups.  He illustrates this point with a 
fascinating reconstruction of the connections between the 1812 Cadiz constitution of Spain 
and the 1822 Portuguese constitution.  He shows how the historically-influential 1812 Spanish 
document was drafted by a largely unrepresentative assembly, in which, for idiosyncratic 
reasons having to do with the French invasion and the prior development of transatlantic 
commercial routes, liberal elements and Church representatives were overrepresented, while 
conservative elements (mainly landowners and traditional ruling classes) were 
underrepresented. The liberal institutions designed in Cadiz in 1812 transferred almost 
unchanged to the 1822 Portuguese constitution despite the different social composition of that 
constitutional assembly, and, through complex turns, influenced the subsequent waves of 
constitution-making in Portugal until the early 20
th century.    34 
In the second article in the collection, Thomas Ertman’s analysis of the momentous 
1832 Reform Act in Britain, we also see how non-class dynamics intruded on a major episode 
of democratization.  Here, however, we also begin to see the impact of party politics on 
democratization.  Ertman’s innovative contribution demonstrates that, although a 
revolutionary shadow certainly hung over events in Britain (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000), 
it was not class conflict directly but rather religious conflict in the late 1820s that initially put 
parliamentary reform on the agenda.  After legislative discrimination against Nonconformists 
and Catholics was lifted in 1828-9, the Ultra Tories within the Conservative Party contended 
that such anti-Anglican legislation passed only with the aid of corrupt rotten boroughs, and 
pushed for reform.  Though it was a Whig government that eventually pushed through 
parliamentary reform in 1832, it was a diverse coalition that reduced the number of 
“nomination” boroughs and expanded the suffrage by 45 percent.  According to Ertman, the 
years 1828-1832 were a critical juncture in which “a fundamental, unforeseen transformation 
of a political regime occurring over a relatively short period of time was a result of decisions 
by a small number of actors." The 1828-1832 juncture had momentous consequences: not 
only did the electoral reform provide a “precedent” for subsequent reforms but also, in the 
conflicts of those years, a stable two party system emerged that was initially centered on 
religious cleavages.  This party system, Ertman contends, even though it was transformed by 
the rise of labor, provided a bulwark of institutionalized stability, supported by a strong and 
moderate conservative party, helping keep democracy intact despite the polarizing dynamics 
of the interwar period in the twentieth century.   
In the volume’s third contribution, we also see the predominant role of parties in 
helping the consolidation of democracy.  Stephen Hanson’s analysis focuses on the power of 
ideational factors carried by political parties during critical junctures.  In phases of high   35 
uncertainty, Hanson argues, when ordinary constraints on political agency are loosened, 
political actors proposing clear and consistent ideological messages stand a better chance of 
emerging politically victorious. He applies this insight to the tumultuous developments and 
political reversals accompanying the birth of the French Third Republic in the 1870s, in which 
the ideologue Leon Gambetta ultimately emerged as the demiurge of Republican France.  
Hanson’s narrative suggests that although structural and modernization variables such as the 
level of industrialization and others were important “background factors” in the stabilization 
of the Third Republic, these could just as likely have been mobilized in an anti-democratic 
direction as in a democratic one. Instead, Hanson emphasizes, it was the power of clear and 
consistent ideological messages articulated by political leaders that directly and gradually 
rallied the support of a large constituency, built a party organization, and ultimately shaped 
France’s Republican institutions.  Like other chapters in this volume, Hanson's emphasizes 
that the effects of the creation of the democratic institutions in question outlasted the 
conditions of their creation, and provided a common framework for competition also to new 
radical forces that emerged in the subsequent decades.  In sum, Hanson’s analysis engages 
existing accounts of democratization, proposing a potentially more general explanation for the 
outcome of constitutional battles in political transitions that can guide future research.  
In Amel Ahmed’s article, we turn to a key set of electoral reforms (e.g. the rise of 
proportional representation and single-member district pluralism) in the late nineteenth 
century that indirectly helped democracies consolidate by reducing the “threats” posed to old 
elites by democratization.  Ahmed analyzes the political struggles leading to the adoption of 
the single-member plurality (SMP) electoral system in Britain in the 1880s and the adoption 
of proportional representation (PR) in Belgium in the 1890s.  In both contexts, Ahmed 
supplements standard accounts that emphasize either socioeconomic factors or strictly   36 
partisan calculations in explaining electoral reform.  While it is often argued that PR was 
introduced to counter-act the effects of suffrage expansion for established traditional elites, 
Ahmed’s insight is that not just PR but both SMP and PR were intended to counteract the 
distributional and various risks associated with democratization. If PR insures incumbents 
against the danger of over-representing the left, SMP opens up the opportunity to “play the 
game” of partisan redistricting which can be used to secure minority representation. The 
adoption of each system reflected whether or not other strategies of “containment” (including 
Lib-Lab agreements, suppression of labor, etc.) were successful. Furthermore, she notes 
importantly, splits within parties were crucial for shaping institutional outcomes, but these 
splits were driven in key instances by the ideas of the actors themselves rather than by the 
electoral geography of their support.  
Kopstein and Wittenberg tackle the issue of why important Eastern European countries 
turned democratic or became authoritarian in the interwar years. The analysis of the key 
turning point of 1925-26 in both Czechoslovakia and Poland allows them to reject 
conventional class-based accounts of regime development in the region, and to show that the 
apparent correlation between the strength of the bourgeoisie in Czechoslovakia and Poland 
and the regime outcome, respectively democratic and authoritarian, says very little about the 
actual way in which these regimes came about. The episode of 1925-26 shows in all its 
strength the key importance of ethnic rather than class cleavages, and cross-ethnic rather than 
cross-class distributional tensions, to regime outcomes in the post-Versailles order. Once the 
ethnically-dominant group had appropriated state spoils and resources in the wake of 
independence, dominant ethnic parties could only ensure the country’s governability building 
multi-ethnic coalitions. The more ethnically accommodating ideology of the Czechoslovak 
Agrarians, Kopstein and Wittenberg argue, gave the party more credibility in negotiating a   37 
cross-ethnic coalition with their Sudeten-German counterparts, which would stabilize the 
regime for a decade until contrasts emerged again within and between key actors. In Poland, 
the chauvinist ideology of the National Democrats made a cross-ethnic coalition unviable, and 
ethnic incorporation could only be achieved under Pilsudski’s authoritarian regime. The in-
depth analysis of these years challenges conventional accounts of democratization, showing 
that the achievement of political democracy in Eastern Europe ultimately ironically required 
sidelining the urban bourgeoisie of the dominant ethnic group.  
The power of ideas and diffusion, the cross-class nature of political parties, and the 
importance of cross-organizational alliances emerge as determinant factors for Nancy 
Bermeo’s comparative analysis of the creation of the Portuguese Republic in 1911 with the 
democratic transition in Portugal in 1974. Bermeo emphasizes how these factors were crucial, 
in different ways, in both circumstances, above and beyond the effect of socio-structural and 
class factors. In 1911, structural conditions (high level of inequality and low level of 
development) would be considered unfavorable to democracy by most structuralist accounts 
of democratization.  Structural conditions certainly correlate with the outcome. However, the 
historical analysis of the process leading to the establishment of unfair elections shows that 
the religious and the monarchy/republic cleavages, rather than distributional ones, drove the 
political conflict. In 1974, class dynamics also appear unrelated to the actual unfolding of the 
process of democratization. On the one hand, all main political actors on the scene (the 
political parties, and the military) had cross-class social constituencies. On the other hand, the 
very negative example of the unfair election that resulted from the 1911 opening itself had an 
important impact on the public at large, binding political actors to commit to fair elections 
even though that was not in their immediate interest. Furthermore, a very important point of 
contrast between 1911 and 1974, Bermeo notes, is the external sponsorship of Portuguese   38 
parties by their democratically-minded Western European sister parties. These supported the 
organization of the newly reconstituting Portuguese parties, and helped convince them to 
abandon the practices of electoral fraud that had hindered democratization in 1911.  
In the final article in the collection, Kurt Weyland asks a crucial question for the 
volume as a whole: under what conditions do democratic “openings” occur in the first place?  
The implication of most analyses of Europe’s historical democratization is that the conditions 
for a “democratic opening” arise from within regimes, as conflicts among classes and leaders 
reach a breaking point, or where the risks of democratic change are so low as to make 
democratization unthreatening. The insight that democratic openings can be exogenous to 
domestic social dynamics and can come from diffusion processes has not been systematically 
incorporated in the study of Europe’s historical democratization.  Weyland’s contribution 
goes beyond the established literature’s focus on domestic conditions by examining the 
impact of external impulses on European democratization from 1830 to 1940. Specifically, 
Weyland’s article analyzes the diffusion of regime conflict, and how precedents of regime 
collapse, such as the overthrow of French kings in 1830 and 1848, tended to produce dramatic 
waves of political contention across Europe, which then resulted in different outcomes. In 
sum, Weyland offers a new perspective that supplements the traditional emphasis on 
economic development and economic collapse as determinants of such openings. 
5. Conclusion 
This volume outlines the contours of a wide-ranging research agenda not only for 
studying Europe’s past, but also for making sense of the difficult, incomplete and often 
protracted process by which democratic political institutions are created today, and often 
remain vulnerable to dynamics of competitive authoritarianism, or democratic backsliding   39 
(e.g. Levitsky and Way, 2002; Diamond, 2008). The approach developed here conceptualizes 
democratization as an inherently long-run chain of linked episodes of struggles and 
negotiations over institutional change.  It is often in these ex post less visible moments that the 
political institutions of democracy are created and reshaped. This conceptualization has two 
main consequences for future research. On the one hand, a focus on episodes of struggle over 
institutional change should supplement the normally dominant concerns about single 
“transition” thresholds, or broad trajectories of democratization over several centuries. The 
methodology outlined in this article offers scholars a potentially powerful research strategy to 
do so, allowing them to test and generate competing explanations “on the ground” in key 
moments of decision, where broad macro-factors “play themselves out” in interaction with 
more conjunctural determinants. On the other hand, scholars need to ask: what links these 
episodes together into long-run patterns? Analyses of institutional change in political 
economies have started to develop fully this insight (e.g. Hall 2010, 209). In the study of 
democratization, the outcomes of earlier episodes of institutional change constitute important 
antecedents of later political struggles, empowering certain political actors, disadvantaging 
others, and providing important narratives to both along the way.  
Armed with this approach to the study of democratization, the articles in this 
collection show that democratization in Europe was neither the inexorable outgrowth of 
economic modernization, nor the “best fit” for a newly dominant socio-economic class. 
Rather, it was the result of intense domestic conflicts along different lines of cleavage, and 
was shaped by transnational impulses, intellectual exchanges, and momentous events that had 
an impact that traveled across national boundaries in a fashion that we often myopically 
imagine is distinctive to our own age. Furthermore, the analyses presented here highlight the 
importance of political parties in shaping democratic reforms, often not as simple   40 
intermediary factors that merely “complicate” the translation of social pressures into 
institutional outcomes, but as “prime movers” of democratization itself. Future research 
should therefore place political parties at the center of analysis: ignoring the role that they 
played in the fight over democratic institutions may deeply misconstrue the process of 
democratization.  
Finally, this new literature also makes clear that the solidity of our contemporary 
definitions of democracy and our neatly compact periodization schemes of “democratic 
waves” can potentially mislead us to overlook other important episodes of change, as well we 
“near-misses” in the long run process of European democratization. Despite its normative 
coherence, democracy is more often the result of “crooked lines” (Eley, 2005) than of linear 
and sweeping changes.  By challenging conventional images of democratization, our approach 
not only contributes to a more nuanced and accurate understanding of European 
democratization, but also provides a research strategy for coming to empirical terms with this 
core feature of our political reality, whether one studies democracy’s past or present. 
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1 As explained below, this includes the cases in which reform was possible but narrowly 
failed.  
2 Needless to say, we recognize that these categories and assumptions are often primarily 
intended as analytical tools that can effectively be deployed for purposes of analytical 
simplicity and communicative convenience. Our argument is in response to the not 
uncommon situation when such categories are reified, taking on a life of their own, thus 
giving rise to misleading conclusions. 
3 In recent work, Boix (2010) and Cusack et al. (2010) undertake historical case work as we 
suggest here, indicating a broader move to this type of analysis in the study of democracy’s 
institutional development. 
4 To those who insist that after singular threshold moments of democratic “transition,” (e.g. 
post 1989), “democracy” is achieved wholesale, we note the growing practice of combining 
elections with authoritarianism despite the presence of democratic constitutions (e.g Levitsky 
and Way, 2002; see also Ziblatt, 2009a).  It is thus crucial to focus on single democratic 
institutions and the long-run of development of democratic regimes. 
5 Indeed, in many European countries democratic institutions have historically been closely 
linked to the establishment of additional institutional arrangements —e.g. federal, 
“corporatist”, “consociational”, “militant”, specific electoral rules, particular forms of 
executive-legislative relations (e.g. Loewenstein 1937; Lijphart 1968; Schmitter 1974). 
6 For an innovative elaboration of “critical antecedents” see Slater and Simmons (2010). 
7 Methodological scholarship warns about the pitfall of “selection bias” in the use of 
secondary sources in comparative historical research (e.g. Goldthorpe 1991; Lustick 1996;   53 
                                                                                                                                                         
Trachtenberg 2006). In analyzing discrete episodes of institutional change, however, it is 
generally feasible both to analyze the necessary primary evidence and to use the appropriate 
secondary sources in an unbiased fashion. 
8 One illustration of this idea is seen in Dahl’s discussion of the elaborate steps necessary to 
translate “objective” economic inequality into political grievances (Dahl 1971, p. 95).  
9 A similar logic is seen in Ekiert’s (1996) analysis of the diffusion of Communist regime 
crises in East Central Europe (1956, 1968, 1980-81) that in no small part contributed the 
subsequent “bigger” crisis in the communist world in 1989. 
10 It should be noted here that Rokkan’s influential framework has been convincingly 
criticized for being retrospective and ultimately functionalist (Bertnzen and Selle 1990, p. 
132; Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, p. 344). 
11 One partial exception is Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2006, p. 179) tantalizing but brief 
suggestion that political parties can be seen as “specific investments” that contribute to 
democratic consolidation because of the sunk costs associated with their creation. 
12 The importance of party and interest group relations is also highlighted in Cusack et al. 
(2010). 